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Abstract 
Google advertises the Android permission framework 
as one of the core security features present on its 
innovative and flexible mobile platform. The permissions 
are a means to control access to restricted AP/s and 
system resources. However, there are Android 
applications which do not request permissions at all. 
In this paper, we analyze the repercussions of 
installing an Android application that does not include 
any permission and the types of sensitive information that 
can be accessed by such an application. We found that 
even app/icaaons with no permissions are able to access 
sensitive information (such the device !D) and transmit it 
to third-parties. 
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1. Introduction 
Permission systems were introduced in the early days 
of computing when desktop computers were regarded as 
an emerging technology [ 18]. Traditionally, permissions 
were used to assign file access rights (tOr example: read, 
write) to users and also to regulate access to lower-levels 
of the operating system (for example as superuser). The 
operating system keeps a list - Access Control List 
(ACL) -in order to document the permission rights for 
each user who has access to the machine. 
Google implemented a similar idea in its Android 
mobile operating system. Android includes a Linux 
kemel (and its libraries) which serves as its base 
operating system, a Dalvik virtual machine, an 
application middleware layer and lastly, a set of system 
applications. Each application is assigned its own user ID 
(UID) and is executed in individual sandboxes. Even 
though the applications' executions are separated, 
Android allows inter-application communication, 
provided that the correct levels of permissions have been 
assigned. Permissions are also required to access 
restricted system resources, such as the contact list. 
Whilst most applications do contain permissions, some 
might not necessarily make use of them; it depends on 
their functionalities. 
This work investigates the consequences of installing 
an application that does not request any permission and 
determines the sensitive information such an application 
can have access to. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: In Section 2, we describe Android pennissions 
in further detail and also present some relevant work in 
the Android permission area; we describe the potential 
attacks by a zero pennission application on a device and 
possible defenses against such attacks in Section 3. In 
Section 4, we provide a discussion around zero 
permission applications and lastly, we give our 
conclusions and ideas for future work in Section 5. 
2. Android Permissions 
Android applications are available for 
download/purchase from Google~ s official market, 
Google Play [12], as well as from multiple third-party 
markets. The applications are available in .APK 
(application package file) format, which is essentially an 
optimized version of Java code. Each APK file includes 
the application's code (.dex files), multimedia resources, 
certificates, and the AndroidManifest.xml where the 
permissions are defined. The .xml file includes <uses-
permission> and <permission> tags to allow developers 
to request permissions. The <uses-permission> tag is 
used if the developer needs to request any permission that 
has been predefined by Google. Currently, there are 130 
official Android permissions running on Android 4.0. 
The other <permission> tag allows developers to define 
customized permissions in their applications. 
Pennissions can be classified into four types [11]: 
Normal, Dangerous, Signature and SignatureorSystem. 
Normal permissions do not require the user's approval 
but they can be viewed after the application has been 
installed. Dangerous permissions are displayed to the 
user and require confirmation in order to proceed with 
the installation process; these pennissions have access to 
restricted resources and can have a negative impact if 
used incorrectly. Permissions classified under the 
Signature category arc granted automatically, provided 
that the requesting application is signed with the same 
certificate as the application that declared the permission. 
Finally, SignatureorSystem permissions arc granted to 
those applications that have the same certificates as the 
Android system image. 
Android adopts an 'install~time' permission granting 
policy [2]. In this case, once the application is 
downloaded the user will have to acknowledge the 
permission request in order to be able to use the 
application. Once the permissions are granted, they 
cannot be revoked unless the application is completely 
uninstalled. The authors in [1, 6, 15, 20] have developed 
methodologies that can provide users with more 
flexibility over the permissions once they are granted. 
In [7], Enck et al. provided some insight into the 
Android security model by demonstrating the usc of 
permissions during install~time and through inter-
component communication. In their work, the authors 
explained that whilst application developers are allowed 
to control access to restricted resources by defining 
permissions in the AndroidManifest.xml file, they can 
also regulate inter~component communications. In regard 
to the latter, Enck et al. mentioned that developers can 
prevent other applications from accessing an 
application's components by either explicitly assigning 
permissions to those components or declaring the 
components to be private instead of public. 
The work ofChaudhuri et al. [4] focused on designing 
semantics that can be used to formulate abstract 
representation of a particular application. The authors 
argued that their work can reveal the integrity of an 
application before the user installs it. This is useful in 
cases where third~party applications are required to 
interact with the components of those applications that 
come pre~installed on an Android phone. 
The Android Penn iss ion framework allows developers 
to use Google's predefined set of permissions or generate 
their own, depending on the requirements of the 
applications being developed. Shin et al. [21] found a 
flaw in the customized permission scheme: since 
developers are not required to follow any naming 
conventions while defining their own permissions, the 
authors pointed out that this can introduce conflicted 
permissions. They implemented a legitimate banking 
application and a malicious application, both sharing a 
customized permission of the same name, to demonstrate 
how the privileges for the rogue application escalated by 
exploiting the vulnerability. 
Felt et al. [8] and Bartel et al. [3] developed tools that 
can assist both users and developers to assess the 
integrity and reliability of applications before they are 
installed or uploaded on the market. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that if an application 
does not require access to any of the restricted system 
resources, the developer can choose not to include any 
permission in the AndroidManifest.xml tile. In the next 
section, we will elaborate futthcr on this patticular case. 
3. Potential Attacks and Defenses 
In this section, we investigate the possible negative 
ramifications of installing an application with no 
permission by conducting a manual investigation of the 
application and also the defense mechanisms that are 
present in the literature to counter this issue. 
3.1 Attacks 
In one of his online posts, Brodeur [16] pointed out 
that an application that does not request any permission 
can scan the extemal storage directory and retum a list of 
applications and files that are stored on the SDcard. This 
information can be accessed at /sdcard/. This 
vulnerability is rather predictable as Google grants read~ 
only access to the SDcard on any device irrespective of 
the OS version that it is running on. 
Additionally, a similar exploit can be carried out on 
the intemal memory by scanning the 
/data/system/packages.list folder to retrieve the Jist of 
package names of those applications that are installed on 
the device. Furthermore, in the same folder, the file 
packages.xml stores the shared permissions of all 
applications on the device along with their corresponding 
U!Ds. 
The aforementioned vulnerabilities can be exploited 
by enticing the user to download a decoy application 
which can give the attacker access to a backdoor on the 
victim's device, as explained by Cannon in [22]. Cannon 
used an active remote shell to interact with the device 
and therefore had access to the data on the device. 
Furthermore, Brodeur demonstrated that the absence of 
INTERNET permission does not stop an attacker from 
exporting the captured data onto an extemal server. In 
fact, the URI ACTION VIEW Intent can initiate a Web 
browser call and thus aliow the attacker to transfer data 
via the Internet. This is a common technique used by 
advc11ising libraries designed to leak device ID or 
subscriber ID in order to carry out targeted advertising, 
as observed in [14]. 
3.2 Analysis of the Brodeur Application 
We downloaded and installed Brodeur's zero 
permission application on two versions of Android - 2.3 
and 4.0. We set up an Android emulator, which is 
provided by the Android SDK and executed the 
application in question. At first glance, the installed 
application behaves as any other clean applications. We 
then start a logcat filter, running in parallel with the 
emulator, to monitor the execution behaviors of the zero 
pennission application. 
The application itself includes three buttons - which 
can be customized depending on the nature of the attack. 
Each button carries out an attack and sends the 
information to an external party via the 
URI_ACTION_ VIEW Intent, as explained in sub-section 
3.1. When a user clicks on the first button, the application 
will read any information stored on the SD card and 
transfer it to the attacker. The second button allows the 
attacker to retrieve the application package names that 
are installed on the user's device. Finally, the third button 
returns two important unique identifiers, which are the 
device's SIM and GSM operator identifier. 
Once the aforementioned information is gathered, an 
attacker can then carry out a targeted attack to exploit a 
particular user's device. Moreover, a zero pennission 
application can be used to identify vulnerable Android 
users which will ensure the longevity of the attack, and 
afford a lower risk of being discovered or reported to the 
authorities. 
3.3 Defenses 
It is well-known [9] that the best defense against any 
security attack is achieved by raising user awareness. In 
the case of Android permissions, users need to be 
educated on how to interpret them. A study conducted by 
Felt et a!. [9] showed Android users do not fully 
comprehend the pennissions requests presented to them 
during install-time. Even more alarming is the fact that 
some users do not even take the trouble to read the 
permission descriptions and simply proceed to install the 
application. (This type of user behavior is very common 
when dealing with End-User License Agreements). 
Therefore, since smartphone users do not value the 
importance of permission requests, their absence is 
hardly noticed. 
In addition to training, users may rely on metrics 
before proceeding to download and install applications. 
User ratings, reviews, number of downloads are some of 
the available resources that can help users to assess 
whether or not the application is popular or has caused 
other users any problems. 
The solution proposed by Chin et a!. [5] is also an 
effective way to quickly assess the integrity of an 
application before it is installed on the device. The 
authors developed a tool, ComDroid, that can detect 
potential vulnerabilities in Android applications. In order 
to do so, ComDroid first disassembles the APK file and 
then parses through the code to track the communication 
flow between components. However, it should be noted 
that this method is valid only for applications that are 
downloaded from third-party markets and not the ones 
from Google Play. 
4. Discussion 
In this section, we give our viewpoints on zero 
permission Android applications. 
In its official documentation [13], Googlc states that 
"a basic Android app/icaaon has no permissions 
associated with it, meaning it cannot do anything that 
would adversely impact the user experience or any data 
on the device". For instance, an example of such an 
application could be a customized calculator application 
to calculate tips to be given for good service at an eatery. 
Based on the description provided by Google, the 
aforementioned application should not be able to access 
sensitive/restricted information on a device. However, as 
demonstrated in Section 3, the cmTent security 
vulnerabilities within the Android platform can allow a 
zero permission application to access restricted 
infonnation. 
Furthennore, we believe that imposing rules 
stipulating that all applications must request at least one 
pennission will not necessarily solve the problem. The 
literature shows that application that request unnecessary 
permissions cause far more damage than a zero 
permission application [17, 19]. Moreover, an over-
privileged application can also compromise the 
functionalities of other applications stored on the device; 
the impact of this attack is far beyond the scope than the 
ones mentioned in Section 3. 
Additionally, even though Google considers the 
Android permission system as one of the key security 
features of the platform, it should be noted that users' 
responses to understanding and approving permission 
requests have compromised the security standards of 
Android. The work by Felt eta!. [10] demonstrates the 
lack of comprehension from Android users when it 
comes to understanding and interpreting permission 
requests upon installing an application. In fact, a majority 
of users do not even read the list of permissions and 
simply proceed to download and install the application. 
This shows that users regard the permission system as a 
hassle and therefore will not be concerned even if an 
application does not request any permission. 
5. Future Work 
In this paper, we have given an overview on Android 
pennissions and analyzed and elaborated on the 
implications of zero permission applications. We also 
presented some measures that users can apply to identify 
vulnerable applications. In summary, user understanding 
and user behavior arc the key aspects that can mitigate 
the propagation of rogue applications. 
As future work, we will provide a third-party service 
where Android users can perform a quick scan of 
applications that have been downloaded from Google 
Play and return the user a report, assessing the integrity 
of the applications before installation. 
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